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I.

INTRODUCTION

At common law and until the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence in 1975, declarations against interest were viewed
with great suspicion. As stated by the Court of Errors and
Appeals of Connecticut in 1963, "[t]he dangers inherent in this
type of evidence are so great that a trial judge should not admit
[a declaration against interest] unless, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, he concludes that the particular declaration against
interest meets this test."' The Indiana Appellate Court
observed:
Where declarations [against interest] ...

are received they are

"generally considered a weak class of evidence, by reason of the
fact that the party making them may not have clearly
expressed his meaning, or may have been misunderstood, or
the witness, by unintentionally altering a few words of the
expressions really used, may give an effect to a declaration
completely at variance with what the party did actually say." 2
Until 1975 the strong weight of authority in the United
States excluded an exculpatory declaration by an unavailable
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law.

* Candidate for admission to the bar of the State of Washington.
1. Ferguson v. Smazer, 151 Conn. 226, 232-33, 196 A.2d 432, 436 (1963). The test for
admission of declarations against interest is whether the statement is trustworthy under
the particular circumstances, "that is, that safeguards reasonably equivalent to the oath
and the test of cross-examination exist." Id. Ferguson was a bastardy case. The declaration against interest was a declaration of paternity made by George Twenty, the
deceased brother-in-law of the plaintiff. The defendant offered the declaration to prove
that Twenty, not the defendant, was the father of the plaintiff's illegitimate child. Four
witnesses were prepared to swear to the extrajudicial statement, but the evidence was
excluded.
2. McGraw v. Horn, 134 Ind. App. 645, 649-50, 183 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1962) (citing
Culp v. Wilson, 133 Ind. 294, 296, 32 N.E. 928, 929 (1893)).
3. Exculpatory statements are declarations made by an out-of-court declarant that
implicate the declarant and exonerate the defendant. The defendant normally uses the
statements at trial to show that someone else confessed to committing the crime. For a
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witness even if the witness, rather than the defendant, had committed the crime for which the defendant stood charged." Wigmore called the rule "barbarous,"6 and Mr. Justice Holmes
observed that "no other statement is so much against interest as
a confession of murder."' No one dared propose, however, that
the inculpatory7 declaration of an unavailable witness in a murder trial should be received to convict the defendant when the
unavailable witness declared that he and the defendant committed the crime together. Yet this has been the trend since 1975,8
and it is the rule laid down by the Washington Supreme Court
in State v. Parris.' Under the Parris rule, a declaration against
penal interest by a witness, inculpating both the witness and the
defendant, may be received against the defendant in a criminal
trial. 10 The Parris rule is unsound for the reasons expounded in
Judge William H. Williams' dissent in Parris" and developed in
this article.
In 1975 the United States Congress adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3). 1 2 Four years later, Washington adopted verbatim the same rule, allowing into evidence a hearsay statement
that is against one's interest as an exception to the general principle of excluding hearsay statements. 3 Although this exception
thorough explanation of exculpatory statements, see Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CALiF. L. REv.
1189, 1190 n.7 (1978). See also FEn. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
4. 5 J. WIoMoIw, EVmNCu § 1476 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
5. Id. § 1477.
6. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. Inculpatory sfatements implicate both the declarant and the defendant. Usually,
the prosecution offers out-of-court statements at trial to convict the defendant. The outof-court declarant has more often than not-according to the extrajudicial statement-been a coconspirator or codefendant. Example: A says to B: "C and I just killed
V." The question of admissibility of this statement at C's trial is the focus of this article.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 1190 n.7.
8. See, e.g., FaD. R. EvD. 804(b)(3). See also People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 242
N.W.2d 739 (1976).
9. 98 Wash. 2d 140, 153-54, 654 P.2d 77, 84 (1982).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 154-73, 654 P.2d at 84-94.
12. The Federal Rules of Evidence were approved January 2, 1975, and became
effective July 1, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
13. See infra note 87. WASH. R. Evm. 804(b) provides:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the
time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or crimi-
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was traditionally limited to statements against the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest," the recently adopted version
departs from common law and allows into evidence hearsay
statements that are against the declarant's "penal" interest.
The new "penal interest" exception specifically authorizes
the receipt into evidence of extrajudicial statements that tend to
subject the declarant to criminal liability, at least when the
declarant is "unavailable."' 5 At a criminal trial, such statements
may be exculpatory, exonerating the defendant, or inculpatory,
implicating the defendant. Rule 804(b)(3) expressly allows
exculpatory statements into evidence when "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statements,"16 but the rule does not mention inculpatory statements.
The Parriscourt, by a 6-3 vote, indicated that statements impliand defendant are receivable as against
cating both declarant
17
penal interest.

On the other hand, a declarant's statements implicating the
defendant but not the declarant would not be receivable under
Rule 804(b)(3) or, presumably, under Parris.The fact that the
declarant's interest is disserved supplies the supposed psychological badge of authenticity.'" The damnification of the defendant is justified because the declarant would probably not speak
ill of himself unless the entire statement were true.
Hearsay problems and confrontation clause's difficulties
were among the reasons inculpatory statements were omitted
nal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that
a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement.
14. See Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 58 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REv.
451 (1952).
15. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); WASH. R. EvIn. 804(b)(3). For the definition of "unavailability," see FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
16. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); WASH. R. EVID. 804(a).
17. 98 Wash. 2d at 149-54, 654 P.2d at 81-84. The final version of the rule did not
mention inculpatory statements. The original draft, however, specifically proposed that
inculpatory statements be excluded. The legislative history of this rule continues to be
the subject of a variety of interpretations by the courts. Compare, e.g., 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-110 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as 4 J. WEINSTEIN] with United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 1978).
18. Parris,98 Wash. 2d at 149, 654 P.2d at 81.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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from the rule. 20 Confrontation clause problems are not present
with exculpatory statements because such statements do not
2
speak "against" the defendant, but only speak in his behalf '
An inculpatory statement, however, is directed against the

defendant, and the sixth amendment arguably is violated if the

defendant cannot confront the declarant.2 2 Consequently, inculpatory statements must be scrutinized intensively to see if they
conform to sound hearsay doctrine and confrontation clause
requirements.
2
the Washington Supreme
In 1982, in State v. Parris,'
Court allowed inculpatory statements against penal interest into
evidence without intense scrutiny of either hearsay or confrontation clause requirements.24 Parris affirmed a court of appeals
'decision interpreting ER 804(b)(3) to allow inculpatory statements into evidence.2" The supreme court concluded that
because the penal interest exception adopted the federal rule
verbatim, it was a "firmly rooted exception" and therefore reliable.2 6 The court allowed inculpatory statements into evidence
even though ER 804(b)(3) does not mention inculpatory state20. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (confrontation clause and hearsay
rules protect similar values, but confrontation clause is not a codification of the hearsay
rules).
21. Constitutional principles mandate that exculpatory statements be admitted into
evidence in certain circumstances to ensure the defendant due process and to increase
the chances of a fair trial. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (admission
of exculpatory statement against penal interest may be constitutionally required to preserve defendant's fundamental constitutional right to present witnesses and testimony in
his own behalf).
22. As in Parris,the declarant may be unavailable because of his own invocation of
the self-incrimination clause. 98 Wash. 2d at 144, 654 P.2d at 79.
23. 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
24. The hearsay evidentiary requirements were outlined in Parris, but not closely
scrutinized. These requirements included: (1) the declarant must be unavailable; (2) the
statement had to be against the interest of the declarant at the time the statement was
made; and (3) there must be corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement. Id. at 145-48, 654 P.2d at 79-81.
25. State v. Parris, 30 Wash. App. 268, 278, 633 P.2d 914, 920 (1981), modified, 98
Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
26. At least if "accompanied by corroborating circumstances clearly indicating their
trustworthiness." Parris,98 Wash. 2d at 148, 654 P.2d at 81. The phrase "firmly rooted
exception" comes from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). In Roberts, the Court
focused on the specific sixth amendment confrontation problem involved when inculpatory statements are received under FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3). The Court stated that the
constitutional confrontation clause requirements are met if the statement has adequate
"indicia of reliability." Id. Additionally, "[rieliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. (emphasis
added).
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ments, and even though historical precedent excluded all penal
interest statements from evidence.27
The facts of the Parriscase favored receipt of the evidence,
and the result was the conviction of an apparent heroin pusher.
It is not just right-wing, law-and-order advocacy that today protests "coddling criminals" and "handcuffing police." The Federation of New York State Judges recently announced such a policy resolution:
The residences of people of this State have become barricaded places in which they live behind chained and bolted
doors; the streets have become the lawless marches of robbers,
rapists and felons of every kind who victimize men, women and
children. .

.

. The moral law, the oath of judicial office and the

Canons of Judicial Ethics require every judge to execute the
law by sentencing such defendants to prison terms that will
effectively punish them for the crimes that they have
committed.2
It is incongruous that in a "liberal" era, evidence that would
have been excluded throughout the history of our country
should now be received to convict a criminal defendant.
This article first demonstrates that courts historically did
not trust penal interest statements in general, and that courts
were extremely suspicious of any statements by a third party
that implicated the defendant. Since Washington adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) verbatim, this article then analyzes the legislative history of the rule. The article concludes
that the legislative history favored exclusion of inculpatory
statements but that Congress failed to codify the exclusion
because of unrelated problems. Finally, the article discusses the
confrontation clause problems that arise when inculpatory statements are allowed into evidence. This article argues that the
Parris holding29 should be narrowed, in a case now pending in
the court of appeals,"0 to exclude inculpatory statements alto27. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
28. Quoted in Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1984, at 26, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 23,
1984, at 1, col. 3.
29. 98 Wash. 2d at 153, 654 P.2d at 83-84. Although not discussed in this article,
another case involving inculpatory penal interest statements came before the Washington Supreme Court in 1983. State v. Valladares, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983).
The court adopted, without discussion, the Parris analysis of inculpatory statements

against penal interest. Id. at 670, 664 P.2d at 512. Because Valladares did not analyze
the problem, the earlier Parrisdecision remains the focus of this article.
30. State v. Edmondson, appeal docketed, No. 6942-3-I1 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. II
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gether. The authors urge a rule of exclusion notwithstanding the
supreme court's rejection of this claim as having little merit.3 1

II.

THE

A.

Parris CASE
Facts

John Parris was charged in Thurston County Superior
Court as an accomplice in the unlawful delivery of heroin. He
was arrested while participating in a drug deal that an informant
had arranged with DeHart at a Taco Time restaurant. DeHart
was the charged principal in the conspiracy and the person who
made the incriminating statements about Parris. An undercover
police officer and the informant were at the scene of the drug
purchase. Parris drove up to the restaurant and had a discussion
with DeHart inside his car. After Parris drove away, DeHart
told the officer and the informant that "the drugs were being
gotten." In response to the informant's question, "Do you think
he'll return with the drugs, or the money and the quantity and
replied, "Yes, I think so.
quality will be accurate?", DeHart
'32
There won't be any problem.
Later, at a prearranged time, all parties returned to the restaurant. DeHart walked out from behind the building and delivered the heroin to the undercover police officer. At the same
time, the police officer spotted the car that Parris had been driving earlier, leaving the back of the parking lot.
At trial, DeHart claimed his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and was therefore unavailable as a
witness.3 3 The prosecutor examined the police officer and the
informant regarding DeHart's out-of-court statements made at
the scene of the drug deal. The superior court found the testimony admissible as penal interest statements under ER
804(b)(3). The court of appeals affirmed that decision."
Jan. 31, 1984). See infra text accompanying note 219.
31. State v. Valladares, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 667-68, 664 P.2d 508, 511 (1983) (argument
that inculpatory statements against penal interest implicating an accused are per se
inadmissible not well received by the court).
32. Parris,98 Wash. 2d at 143, 654 P.2d at 78. The dissent argued that the statements made by DeHart at the scene of the crime were inherently untrustworthy because
they were made in response to various questions from the informant and the police
officer. Id. at 155, 162-63, 654 P.2d at 84, 88-89 (Williams, J., dissenting).
33. A declarant is considered unavailable if the declarant "[is exempted by ruling
of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of
his statement." FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(1); WASH. R. Evm. 804(a)(1).
34. State v. Parris, 30 Wash. App. 268, 279, 633 P.2d 914, 921 (1981), modified, 98
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B.

Analysis

In affirming the courts below, the Washington Supreme
Court allowed into evidence inculpatory statements made
against a criminal defendant without adequately addressing the
newly enacted penal interest exception. The court ignored longstanding policies against penal interest statements as a whole
and policies against inculpatory statements in particular. These
policies should have given the court guidance to fill in a legislative omission. Instead, the court adopted a controversial federal
circuit court case, United States v. Alvarez 3 5 that had accepted
inculpatory statements without a thorough analysis of the inherent differences between inculpatory and exculpatory"' statements and without adequately addressing the confrontation
clause problems.
The Parriscourt briefly examined 37 the legislative history of
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), as discussed in Alvarez. The
court concluded that the legislative omission of inculpatory
statements meant that these statements were to be admitted
into evidence.3 8 A closer look at legislative history reveals that
the drafters of the bill and the House wanted total exclusion of
such statements.3 9
The Parris court also failed to scrutinize closely the sixth
amendment confrontation problem, even though the holding
Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982).
35. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978). Throughout the Parrisopinion the court relied on
the Alvarez court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See also United
States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981) (inculpatory statements were
not received in evidence because of the custodial context in which the statements were
obtained). Cf. United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1384 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 742 (1983); United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 819 (1981). Contra United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. White, 553 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977).
36. Exculpatory statements have been constitutionally mandated in some cases. See
supra note 21. Similarly, the confrontation clause mandates exclusion of inculpatory
statements in certain situations. But see Justice Williams' dissent in Parrisfor a different treatment. 98 Wash. 2d at 157-60, 654 P.2d at 85-87.
37. 98 Wash. 2d at 147-48, 654 P.2d at 81.
38. Id. at 148, 654 P.2d at 81. In his dissent, Justice Williams discussed the original
version of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 98 Wash. 2d at 158, 654 P.2d at 86.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 101-36. Justice Rosellini discussed the legislative history of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) in two short paragraphs. Parris,98 Wash. 2d at
147-48, 654 P.2d at 81. The court of appeals omitted in the text of its opinion any reference to the legislative history of the rule. The court did, however, insert two footnotes
that attempted to deal with the rule's confusing legislative history. Parris,30 Wash. App.
at 276 nn.7-8, 633 P.2d at 919 nn.7-8.
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allowed inculpatory statements into evidence without permitting
the defendant to confront the witness who spoke against him."0
Washington's constitution, which calls for "face-to-face" confrontation, suggests a special concern for confrontation clause
problems in the criminal context."1 This concern is underscored
further by the codification of the confrontation right in the
Revised Code of Washington 42 and by Washington's history of
protecting the defendant when confrontation problems arise in a
43
criminal context.
Finally, the Parriscourt completely ignored the history and
policies of the statement against interest exception and its
recent expansion allowing penal interest statements into evidence. That history shows that Washington should have adopted
a narrow reading of rule 804(b)(3) because of the inherent unreliability of third party out-of-court statements that implicate a
44
criminal defendant.
III.

HISTORY OF THE PENAL INTEREST

ExcEPTION

The rule against hearsay' 5 has traditionally mandated that
any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted be excluded from evidence. Hearsay statements
were considered inadmissible because they were inherently unreliable.' 6 Certain situations, however, naturally ensured that an
40. 98 Wash. 2d at 144, 654 P.2d at 79. The sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to confront the witnesses
against him. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (discussing the requirements and purposes of the confrontation clause); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)
(minimum requirements under the confrontation clause).
41. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. The Washington Constitution has a provision parallel
to the sixth amendment, but adds that: "the accused shall have the right ... to meet
the witnesses against him face to face." Id. (emphasis added). In his dissent Justice Williams recognized that these words mean physical confrontation between the witness and
the defendant. Parris,98 Wash. 2d at 154, 654 P.2d at 84. Although the court discussed
the sixth amendment confrontation problem and cited several federal cases, the majority
did not mention Washington's constitutional protections.
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.52.060 (1983).
43. See, e.g., In re Pettit, 62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963); State v. Roberts, 25
Wash. App. 830, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980); State v. Solomon, 5 Wash. App. 412, 487 P.2d 643
(1971).
44. See infra notes 101-36 and accompanying text.
45. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
46. The unreliability of hearsay statements stems from the want of an oath, the
absence of cross-examination, and the inability of the jury to view the declarant's
demeanor. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Donnelly v. United
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out-of-court statement was reliable. Thus, well-recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule evolved. 7
One of the exceptions to the hearsay rule was the "statement against interest" exception."8 The common law allowed
into evidence statements against the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest when the declarant was unavailable 49 at
trial. Only statements against one's property or monetary interests were included at common law. Experience of human nature
suggested that a person would not ordinarily make a statement
against these interests unless it were true. 0 Additionally, these
types of interests were usually evidenced by some sort of writing. 5 ' The statements were, therefore, considered reliable, and
the need to exclude them under the hearsay rule vanished.
Although hearsay statements against one's pecuniary and
proprietary interests were allowed into evidence at common law,
statements against one's penal interest were excluded. Such
statements were treated with great distrust, a distrust stemming
from the famous Sussex Peerage case. 52 In Peerage, the Committee for Privileges of the House of Lords refused to admit
penal statements at trial because it feared that if these statements were admitted, defendants' rights would suffer. The CoinStates, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913). See also C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 245 (2d ed. 1972); 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 17,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
801; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra

note 4, § 1362.
47. Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 enumerate a variety of exceptions to the
general exclusion of hearsay statements.
48. A statement against one's criminal interest was not included within this exception at common law. Jefferson, supra note 14, at 39-40.
49. The declarant is still required to be unavailable. FED. R. EvID. 804; WASH. R.
EVID. 804. This is consistent with the need to show a "special necessity" before the statement will be allowed into evidence. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 253, at 608; Comment, Evidence: The UnavailabilityRequirement of Declaration Against Interest Hearsay, 55 IOWA L. REV. 477, 478 (1969).
50. McCormick agreed that the principal rationale for this exception is based upon
the experience of human nature. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 278. See also G. LILLY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77 (1978) (common observation probably
supports the proposition that one is unlikely to make a disserving statement unless it is
true); 11 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 804.06(3)[1], at VIII-277
(2d ed. 1948).
51. Some commentators suggest that the only viable reason that the statements
against interest exception was limited to pecuniary or proprietary interests was that
these interests usually appeared in accounting books or some other type of document,
decreasing the likelihood of fabrication. See, e.g., 1 S. GREENLEAi, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 150, at 234 (16th ed. 1899) (common law reliance on documentary
evidence); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1476, at 350 (possibility of fabrication the only
plausible reason to exclude penal interest statements).
52. 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844).
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mittee was confronted with an exculpatory statement against
penal interest, but expressed concern that if the rule were
expanded beyond these exculpatory statements, prosecutors
could unjustly use statements that implicated the defendant. 3
The Committee was concerned about the trustworthiness of all
any type of
penal interest statements, but expressly rejected
54
statement implicating a criminal defendant.
Federal and state courts in the United States followed Sussex Peerage.5 5 In 1913 the United States Supreme Court, though
divided 6-3, rejected penal interest statements in Donnelly v.
United States.5 6 The Donnelly Court argued that the virtually
unanimous weight of state court authority was against penal
interest statements. 57 The Court did not review its own authority because it was deemed well settled that penal interest statements were to be excluded. 58 The Court also noted that the dangers of hearsay in general are great, and that no court should
lightly yield to the "introduction of fresh exceptions."'
Additional considerations justified exclusion of penal interest statements. Declarations of criminal activity are often motivated by selfish considerations and are not as reliable as statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest. 0° Judicial
exclusion of penal interest statements prevailed until 1975, when
Congress promulgated the new evidence rules.
Justice Holmes advocated acceptance of exculpatory penal
interest statements in his famous dissent in Donnelly, in which
he stated: "[N]o other statement is so much against interest as a
confession of murder.""1 Holmes was concerned in Donnelly,
however, with exculpatory statements and the defendant's constitutional right to produce a witness. No one has suggested that
the renowned dissenter advocated receipt of inculpatory penal
53. Id. at 1042.
54. Id. at 1045.
55. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 47 Mich. App. 307, 309, 209 N.W.2d 527, 528
(1973); Halvorsen v. Moon & Kerr Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 18, 21-22, 91 N.W. 28, 29
(1902); In re Wininegar, 337 P.2d 445, 451-52 (Okla. Crim. 1958) (rehearing opinion). See
also cases cited at 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 1476-77.
56. 228 U.S. 243, 276 (1913).
57. Id. at 273-74 n.1.
58. Id. at 276.
59. Id. at 276-77.
60. See generally Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: What Must Be Corroborated Under the Newly Enacted Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 804(b)(3), 9 VAL.
U.L. REV. 421 (1975).
61. 228 U.S. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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interest statements.
Although some commentators argued that excluding penal
interest statements was illogical, 2 such statements were almost
universally excluded until the new federal rules were promulgated in 1975. Even subsequent to adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, some states declined to adopt the penal interest
exception."
IV.

HISTORY OF PENAL INTEREST STATEMENTS IN WASHINGTON

Before 1967 Washington adhered strictly to the Donnelly
policy that penal interest statements were inherently unreliable." In 1967 the Washington Supreme Court excluded exculpa5 The court concluded that
tory statements in State v. Garrison."
the statement against interest exception included only proprietary or pecuniary interests. The court did not reach the penal
interest issue because the statement was held not to be one
against the declarant's "interest" and because the declarant was
not, as the rule requires, unavailable.6 "
62. Wigmore referred to the exclusion of penal interest statements as a "barbarous
doctrine." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1477, at 360. He argued that a person would be
just as unlikely to make a statement that would subject him to criminal punishment as
he would in circumstances involving monetary or property obligations. Additionally,
Wigmore said that the Peerage decision represented a step backward in the rule of
exceptions for statements against interest. Id. § 1476, at 351.
Weinstein states that the likelihood of perjured confessions to crimes is a policy
reason for rejecting the penal interest exception, even though most courts fail to recognize this as a basis for their decisions. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 17, V 804(b)(3)[011, at
804-91. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 278 (hypothesizing that "the fear of
opening a door to a flood of prepared witnesses falsely testifying to confessions that were
never made," was a motivation for exclusion of penal statements). But see Jefferson,
supra note 14, at 39-43; Note, supra note 60, at 424.
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 804(b)(3)(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(c)
(West 1979); ME. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) (1982); NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.345 (1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A, Rule 63(10) (West 1976); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (1983).
64. See, e.g., Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash. 2d 35, 54-60, 129 P.2d 813, 821-24 (1942)
(setting out the traditional theory of this exception and outlining the common law
requirements).
65. 71 Wash. 2d 312, 427 P.2d 1012 (1967). Garrison was charged with burglary in
the second degree. He was stopped in a car that was carrying four cases of beer that had
been spotted earlier being carried out the back door of a tavern. Id. at 312-13, 427 P.2d
at 1013. The defendant sought to admit statements by his accomplice to a police officer
that the stolen beer belonged to the accomplice and that the defendant had had nothing
to do with getting the beer. Id. at 313, 427 P.2d at 1013.
66. Id. at 314, 427 P.2d at 1014. No reason was given why the declarant could not be
subpoenaed or why he would not testify. The court noted that the statement was not
against the declarant's penal interest because it was not a declaration for which he could
be punished. Id. The statements were merely an attempt to absolve both the declarant
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Two appellate courts, just prior to adoption of the new federal rules, briefly discussed penal interest statements. 6 7 In State
v. Grant, the court noted that case law in other jurisdictions was
split on whether or not penal interest statements should be
allowed into evidence. 8 The court, however, did not directly
confront the issue because the general requirement of unavailability had again not been met. 9
In State v. Wicker,70 the appellate court stated that the
question of the penal interest exception in Washington was "an
open one."'7 1 The court noted, however, that the "confession of
an 'accomplice' . . . is . . . unreliable[,] . . . particularly where
it is uncorroborated and not inherently inconsistent with the
guilt of the accused. '72 The Wicker court cited the then proposed federal rule for the proposition that even exculpatory
statements are unreliable. 3
Following adoption of the federal rules, Washington courts
confronted exculpatory penal interest statements in State v.
Gardner.74 The court concluded that declarations against penal
interest could be admitted into evidence as exceptions to the
hearsay rule only when all constitutional and evidentiary
requirements were met.76 The court struggled with the new constitutional mandate to admit certain exculpatory statements
into evidence when due process so required.7 ' The court was
forced to address the issue when the defendant argued that an
and the defendant from the burglary, rather than the admission of an unlawful act. Id.
67. State v. Wicker, 10 Wash. App. 905, 520 P.2d 1404 (1974); State v. Grant, 9
Wash. App. 260, 511 P.2d 1013 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974).
68. 9 Wash. App. 260, 268, 511 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1973).
69. Id. at 268, 511 P.2d at 1018-19. Although Grant involved exculpatory statements, the court was hesitant, because of the heinous nature of the murders, to allow
defendants to bring in. unreliable evidence. Two women had been raped, stabbed, and
asphyxiated, and two six-year-old boys had been beaten and stabbed to death. Id. at
261-63, 511 P.2d at 1015.
70. 10 Wash. App. 905, 520 P.2d 1404 (1974).
71. Id. at 909, 520 P.2d at 1406.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 13 Wash. App. 194, 534 P.2d 140 (1975). In Gardner,a prostitute was on trial for
assault and battery for using a piece of glass to slash a man's eye. The defendant claimed
that it was an act of self-defense. Part of her defense was the statement of a young
woman who had been a witness at the scene corroborating the defendant's self-defense
claim. The young woman was killed prior to trial, however, and the defense attorney
offered the dead woman's statement. Id. at 195-96, 534 P.2d at 140-41.
75. Id. at 196, 534 P.2d at 141.
76. Id. at 197, 534 P.2d at 141.
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exculpatory statement had to be admitted as a matter of constitutional due process."'
The Gardnercourt held that the United States Constitution
required certain exculpatory penal interest statements to be
admitted on behalf of the defendant." The court remained suspicious of exculpatory statements, however, and adopted a stringent test for their admissibility:7 9 the admission of such evidence
must be necessary to prevent "manifest injustice."80 Gardner
failed to meet these strict requirements and the exculpating
statement was excluded at trial.81
The Gardner court adhered to the view that penal interest
statements are unreliable.8 2 The court cited decisions in other
jurisdictions evincing a reluctance to expand the traditional
statement against interest exception because of the unreliability
of criminal confessions, which are often motivated by extraneous
considerations.s
The Washington Supreme Court adopted the penal interest
rule, as formulated by Gardner, in State v. Young."4 Although
the court found exculpatory statements constitutionally mandated in some instances, the court remained skeptical of penal
interest statements in general and emphasized that the majority
of states would not allow any type of penal interest declaration
into evidence. 6
77. The defendant cited Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), as authority

for her claim. When the petitioner in Chambers was not allowed to cross-examine a witness or introduce testimony important to his case, the Supreme Court held that he had
been denied a fair trial in violation of the due process clause. Id. at 302.
78. 13 Wash. App. at 196, 534 P.2d at 141.
79. The Gardner court stated that "[wihat Chambers does is to constitutionally
mandate use of the declaration against penal interest exception . . . when the evidence
offered under that exception equates with the objective special circumstances found in
Chambers, and the admission of such evidence is necessary to prevent manifest injustice." Id. at 198, 534 P.2d at 142.
80. Id. at 200, 534 P.2d at 143.
81. Id. at 199, 534 P.2d at 143.
82. Id. at 198-99, 534 P.2d at 142-43.
83. Id. at 199, 534 P.2d at 143. See also F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATMONAND CONFESSIONS 114-15 (2d ed. 1967) (some confessions are motivated by the
promise of leniency or immunity); T. REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS 261 (3d ed.
1959) (examines courts' reluctance to admit penal interest statements because of a fear
of perjury and false confessions).
84. 89 Wash. 2d 613, 627, 574 P.2d 1171, 1180, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
85. Id. at 626, 574 P.2d at 1179. Young was typical of a pattern that emerged in
other courts of excluding exculpatory statements in murder trials. In Young, a bomb had
been sent to the chambers of the judge who was going to sit at Young's pre-trial hearing.
The bomb exploded, instantly killing the judge. The court refused to admit into evidence
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One year after Young, Washington adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3)."" The new rule and accompanying comments did not address inculpatory statements. The comment to
ER 804(b)(3) stated that Washington had no prior authority on
statements furnishing the basis for criminal liability and that
rule 804 "expands" and "clarifies" the scope of the exception. 7
ER 804(b)(3) expanded the common law exception by embracing
exculpatory statements.88 However, because it omitted any mention of inculpatory statements,8 9 the rule did not "clarify" the
scope of the exception.
Following codification of the penal interest exception,
Washington maintained stringent requirements for the admissibility of exculpatory statements against penal interest.9 0 In 1980
the Washington Court of Appeals refused to admit exculpatory
statements in State v. Russell ' because the minimum eviden92
tiary requirements enumerated in Chambers had not been met.93
Russell sought admission of the written statement of a friend.
The statement would have suggested that its author had misrepresented her identity to the defendant and that the defendant
had been given permission to use two credit cards tlfat purportedly belonged to the author but that were in fact stolen.9 4 The
trial court excluded the statement.9 5
Although Russell excluded an exculpatory penal interest
statement, a footnote in the opinion intimated that ER 804 may
letters sent to the news media from an organization calling itself the People's Army and
stating that the judge had been assassinated as "a purely military act of class struggle."
Id. The court relied on the failure to meet the unavailability requirement when it denied
defendant's attempt to admit the letters as exculpatory statements. Id. at 627, 574 P.2d
at 1180.
86. The Washington Rules of Evidence became effective on April 2, 1979.
87. WASH. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) comment. One Washington commentator believed that
inculpatory statements were without question part of the new 804 exception. See Meisenholder, FederalRules 803(17)-806, in THE PROPOSED WASHINGTON RULES OF EVIDENCE
84, 127 (1978) (sponsored by U. of Puget Sound, Continuing Legal Education). The rule
permits the prosecution to introduce declarations that inculpate the accused, but places
specific limitations upon introduction of an exculpatory statement. Additionally, inculpatory statements introduced by the prosecutor need not be supported by corroborating
evidence under the literal language of the rule. Id. at 122-28.
88. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
91. 27 Wash. App. 309, 617 P.2d 467 (1980).
92. Id. at 314-15, 617 P.2d at 471.
93. Id. at 311, 617 P.2d at 469.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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have weakened Washington's strict criteria." The court noted
that "a relevant statement is admissible even though it may not
be inconsistent with the guilt of the accused so long as it is
clearly trustworthy.

' e7

However, since the court was confronted

with an exculpatory statement, no inference that the rule should
be broadened to include inculpatory statements can be indulged.
Additionally, in 1982 the same appellate court specifically listed
the "inherently inconsistent with the guilt of the accused" language as a requirement before the penal interest statement
could be introduced at trial.""
It was against this background of distrust that the Washington Court of Appeals confronted inculpatory statements against
penal interest in State v. Parris." The court permitted the
admission of inculpatory statements even though the state and
federal constitutions suggest, and possibly require, exclusion of
these statements. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, 100
thus ignoring Washington's apparent policy and its historical
disfavor of hearsay statements in general and inculpatory statements against penal interest in particular.
V.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE

804(b)(3)

The court of appeals stated in State v. Parristhat the failure of Congress to include inculpatory statements in the
804(b)(3) exception was due in part to legislative "oversight."' 10 '
96. Id. at 314 n.1, 617 P.2d at 471 n.1.
97. Id.
98. State v. Castro, 32 Wash. App. 559, 566, 648 P.2d 485, 490 (1982). Even though
the defendant argued that due process required admission under Chambers, the court
said that the trial court has the discretion to judge corroboration requirements. The Castro court found insufficient corroboration. Id. at 565-66, 648 P.2d at 490.
99. 30 Wash. App. 268, 633 P.2d 914 (1981), modified, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77
(1982). See also State v. Valladares, 31 Wash. App. 63, 639 P.2d 813 (1982), afl'd in part
and rev'd in part, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983).
100. 98 Wash. 2d at 154, 654 P.2d at 84.
101. 30 Wash. App. at 276 n.8, 633 P.2d at 919 n.8. The court did not address the
legislative history in the text of the opinion. In a footnote, however, the court stated:
ER 804(b)(3) makes the corroboration requirement expressly applicable only
to exculpatory statements. A review of the legislative history of Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(3) indicates the failure to make the corroboration requirement applicable to inculpatory statements stems partly from a misreading of Supreme
Court decisions regarding the confrontation clause and partly from legislative
oversight. (Citations omitted.) Recent federal cases construing the new Fed. R.
Evid. (804)(b)(3) have generally applied the corroboration requirement to
inculpatory statements. See United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, [633 F.2d 1092
(5th Cir. 1981)]; United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1980); United
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The state supreme court explained that the only "sensible explanation" for the omission of inculpatory statements is that the
drafters wanted to leave the task of delineating the requirements for admissibility to the courts.10 2 As the following discussion demonstrates, the omission of any reference to inculpatory
statements in the rule was not an "oversight." The legislative
history of the rule indicates that inculpatory statements were
distrusted and were meant to be excluded.
A.

Advisory Committee

The first Advisory Committee draft of rule 804 was published in 1969.103 This first draft of the rule departed from the
common law rule of excluding penal interest statements and
explicitly allowed exculpatory statements against penal interest
into evidence. 10 4 The last sentence of the draft, however, clearly
stated that inculpatory statements were to be excluded under
the rule. 10 5 The committee relied' 0 6 on the dissent in Bruton v.
States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978). We agree with these cases and
believe the corroboration requirement should apply to inculpatory statements.
The drafters of the federal rule left to the courts the task of delineating the
requirements regarding admissibility of inculpatory statements because of the
constitutional questions raised by such statements. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 700.
Applying the corroboration requirement to inculpatory statements is consistent with the "indicia of reliability" language in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Further, failure to require corroboration of inculpatory statements would subvert
the general scheme of the Rules of Evidence, for without the corroboration
requirement the statement against penal interest exception would allow the
state to circumvent the traditional safeguards surrounding the coconspirator
exception to the hearsay rule, ER 801(d)(2). See Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701.
Id. at 276 n.8, 633 P.2d at 919 n.8.
102. 98 Wash. 2d at 148, 654 P.2d at 81.
103. In its preliminary form, the rule was originally numbered 804(b)(4). Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969). The rule was renumbered during the course of
congressional consideration and emerged in its final form as FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
104. The first draft was published after three-and-one-half years of study by an
Advisory Committee appointed by Chief Justice Warren in 1965 to draft rules of evidence for the federal courts. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 173-74 (1969).
105. The first draft provided:

(4)

STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST.

A statement which was at the time of its

making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or
so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a
claim by him against another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or
social disapproval, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the statement unless he believed it to be true. This example does not include a
statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made
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United States'e arguing that inculpatory statements are inherently unreliable.10 8
Subsequent to the first proposed draft, the rule passed
through two sessions of the Standing Committee and publication
for comment by bench and bar with the last sentence excluding
inculpatory statements unchanged. 09 Shortly thereafter, however, the last line of Rule 804(b)(3) was deleted." 0 This ill-conceived revision, some suggest, was prompted by certain powerful
politicians in Congress."'
The sentence was dropped in the final
2
version of the rule."
Although the final draft of the Advisory Committee did not
refer to inculpatory statements, the Advisory Committee's concluding note to the Federal Rules of Evidence cautioned against
allowing inculpatory statements into evidence.1 1 3 The note cited
by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused.
46 F.R.D. at 378 (emphasis added).
106. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 386 (1969) (statements by codefendants implicating each other are unreliable because of self-serving circumstances).
107. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
108. Id. at 138-44.
109. The sentence was retained in the 1971 Advisory Committee draft. Revised
Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51
F.R.D. 315, 438-39 (1971). After publication of the March 1971 draft, criticisms and suggestions were once more submitted to the committee.
110. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321
(1973).
111. Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation
Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 159, 175-76 (1983). The author suggests that Senator John L.
McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee of Criminal Laws and Procedure of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, introduced a bill that would strip the courts of
some rule-making power in response to the Proposed Draft. The Senator thought that
the inclusion of the last sentence would further weaken the federal system of criminal
justice. Id. at 175 n.109. "I would omit entirely the last sentence of 804(b)(1) [sic]." 117
CONG. REc. 33,648 (1971) (remarks by Senator McClellan). See also Tague, Perils of the
Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application and Unconstitutionality of Rule
804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEo. L.J. 851 (1981). Tague refers to a letter
that Senator McClellan sent to the Chairman of the Standing Committee saying that he
would expend all efforts to prohibit further erosion of the federal justice system. Id. at
873.
See also Comment, supra note 3. The Comment mentions statements by Charles R.
Halpern and George T. Frampton to the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice referring to political pressures. Both speakers pointed to Senator McClellan as coercing the
Advisory Committee into making certain changes by threatening to obstruct the entire
project. The Comment suggests that looking to the Advisory Committee's silence on
inculpatory statements is suspect and inadequate. Id. at 1193-94.
112. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
113. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.
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Douglas v. Alabama' 14 and Bruton v. United States11 6 as cases
that had assumed the inadmissibility of all third-person inculpatory statements.1 6 The note expressly outlined two major cautions that suggest the Committee's true stance favored exclusion
of all inculpatory statements.1 1 7 The first caution was that a suspect's motivation to win the favor of prosecutorial authority renders inculpatory statements inherently suspect. 1 8 The motivation to save one's own neck may be present any time a
codefendant or coconspirator makes an inculpatory statement,
regardless of whether or not the declarant is in police custody.
Such inculpating statements tend to exonerate the declarant by
redirecting and spreading responsibility. The motivation behind
such statements makes them grossly unreliable.
The Advisory Committee also warned that "[t]he rule does
not purport to deal with questions of the right of confrontation." 1 9 This caution mandates an intense constitutional scrutiny of inculpatory statements and suggests that inculpatory
statements should be regarded with special suspicion.
The final advisory draft, which deleted any reference to
inculpatory statements, was sent to the congressional committees.120 Congress was split on the issue of inculpatory statements. The House of Representatives sided with the Advisory
Committee's policies and reinserted, with a slight change in the
original wording, the final sentence of 804(b)(3) 2' excluding
114. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
115. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
116. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.
117. Id.
118. The idea that a declarant who is currying favor with authorities will be unreliable has been used in many jurisdictions to justify the exclusion of inculpatory statements. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1384 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
742 (1983) ("curry favor" language used); United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 128
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981) ("curry favor" expression used); United
States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Oliver,
626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 345 (3d Cir.
1978).
119. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.
120. The Supreme Court, over the procedural dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, also
approved this version before it was submitted to the Congress. Douglas was concerned
that such action would lend too much weight to the rule and stated that the Court's
function is as a conduit, approval being purely perfunctory. Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 185-86 (1973).
121. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7075, 7089 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
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inculpatory statements. 2 ' The House addressed its reasons for
excluding inculpatory statements in its final note, which
asserted that the sentence was added "to codify the doctrine of
Bruton.'' 2 3 The House apparently sought to protect the criminal
24
defendant's constitutional rights.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, deleted the reference to inculpatory statements.21 The Senate did not argue
that inculpatory statements are reliable and should be received,
but chose to attack the House's attempted codification of a constitutional principle. 2 6 The Senate was also concerned that the
House version of the rule would exclude inculpatory statements
even if those statements fell under another hearsay exception or
exclusion, 27 such as vicarious admissions and "coconspirator's
statements."
Because of the difference between the House and Senate
versions, the issue had to be resolved by a Joint Conference
Committee. The Conference Committee accepted the Senate's
version of 804(b)(3) and deleted any reference to inculpatory
statements.2 8 The Committee aligned itself with the Senate's
reasoning that Congress should "avoid attempting to codify constitutional evidentiary principles.""" The Senate had been concerned that sixth amendment principles could be stifled in the
future by such a blanket exclusion of all inculpatory statements. 30 As a result, the final version of rule 804(b)(3) had no
express reference to inculpatory statements against penal
interest.' 3'
122. The final sentence of rule 804(b)(3) read: "A statement or confession offered
against the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this exception." 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra
note 17, at 804-11.
123. HousE REPORT, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7051, 7068 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. COMM. OF CONFERENCE, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP.
No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098,
7106.
129. Id.
130. SENATE REPORT, supra note 125.
131. On Dec. 16, 1974, the Senate agreed to the Conference version of the rules. 120
CONG. REc. 40,069-070 (1974). Two days later, the House also accepted that version. Id.
at 40,890-96. The rules became effective on July 1, 1975.
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The omission of any reference to inculpatory statements in
rule 804(b)(3) may be interpreted in two divergent ways. One
interpretation is that the omission of the word "inculpatory"
solidifies the drafters' intent to make these statements admissible. This means that the "omission" left to the courts the task of
deciding the admissibility of these statements.' 3 2 On the other
end of the spectrum, another interpretation concludes that
because the original intent was to exclude inculpatory statements, and because the Advisory Committee note gave two
express warnings against inculpatory statements, these statements should be banned from evidence.1 3 3 The rationale for this
viewpoint is that the last sentence of the rule was dropped
because of unjustified Senate fears 4that actually support the
3
exclusion of inculpatory statements.
Although the legislative history of inculpatory statements in
the Senate and the House was inconsistent, the initial intent of
the drafting committee and the notes following the proposed
evidence rules supported the conclusion that inculpatory statements ought to be excluded. 3 ' Other traditional hearsay exceptions would still be available to prosecutors and litigants. This
conclusion is in accord with the continuing view of many commentators who have considered the matter, and with the practice of pre-1975 courts that inculpatory statements against penal
interest are inherently unreliable and should be excluded. The
new penal interest exception is being used as a "fall-back" for
prosecutors when they cannot justify receipt in evidence of the
same statement under a traditional hearsay exception.

VI.

FEDERAL CASE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

804(b)(3)
After congressional codification of rule 804, federal circuit
132. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1191. The author neglects the two cautionary
statements that the same committee made. In addition, no credence is given to the fact
that influential political pressures might have motivated the committee to drop its original sentence. See supra text accompanying note 111.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
134. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 17, $ 804(b)(3)[031, at 804-112 to -114. Weinstein's argument focuses on the initial drafting that excluded inculpatory statements and
the confrontation clause issue. See also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1477. Wigmore
concluded that the general rationale for the exception to hearsay for statements against
interest is lacking in the context of inculpatory statements.
135. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 386 (1969).
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courts confronted primarily exculpatory statements against
penal interest and problems with admissibility standards for
those statements. 3 6 Cases involving inculpatory penal interest
statements have emerged only recently in federal circuit
courts. 3 7 The context in which the majority of inculpatory statement cases arise, however, shows remarkable consistency. Typically, the hearsay statement is argued under the coconspirator
hearsay exception. When the prosecutor fails to meet the
requirements under this exception, the statement is then offered
under the new 804(b)(3) penal interest exception. 8s
136. These problems include: (1) How much corroboration is necessary? See P.
423

ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES

(2d ed. 1983) (corroboration is a middle ground between the common law exclusion and
drafters' view that penal interest statements should be admissible). See also Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The
Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1465 (1975); Note, Commonwealth v.
Nash: Admissibility of DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 796 (1975).
The rule requiring corroboration for exculpatory statements has been applied to
inculpatory statements by a number of courts. See United States v. MacDonald, 688
F.2d 224, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983); United States v.
Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 742 (1983); United
States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1978).
(2) What does "tended to subject" to criminal liability mean? See State v. Garrison,
71 Wash. 2d 312, 314, 427 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1967) (statement must be an admission of an
unlawful act and be a declaration for which a person could be punished).
(3) How should the "reasonable person" standard be applied? The federal rule uses
a reasonable person standard. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Several states, including Washington, accept this standard. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-460(j) (1983); WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 908.045(4) (West
1975). However, some commentators advocate that the trial judge retain discretionary
power to look at the subjective standard in special circumstances. See, e.g., G. LILLY,
supra note 52, § 78, at 265; 11 J. MOORE & H. BEaNIx, supra note 50, 1 804.06(3)[3], at
VIII-284.
(4) When is a declarant unavailable? Some jurisdictions require the declarant to be
dead. Others recognize insanity, physical incapacity, absence from the jurisdiction, and
the successful claim of privilege. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 280; Note, Evidence-The Unavailability Requirement for DeclarationsAgainst Interest-Should It
Be Retained?, 39 Mo. L. REv. 461 (1974).
(5) Can a statement against penal interest be carved out of a larger hearsay statement? See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.3, at 923-24 n.3 (1981); 5
J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1465 (all parts of speech may be admitted if made while
declarant was in the same trustworthy psychological conditions). See also United States
v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marquez, 462 F.2d 893,
895 (2d Cir. 1972). McCormick summarizes the three different approaches for severance
by the court. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 46, § 279 (admit the entire declaration; compare
the strength of self-serving and disserving interests and admit it all if the disserving
statement preponderates or exclude it all if the self-serving interest is greater; and admit
disserving parts and exclude self-serving parts).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
138. See Note, Inculpatory Declarations Against Penal Interest and the Cocon-
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This pattern surfaced in 1978 in United States v. Alvarez. 13 9 The prosecutor in Alvarez was unable to meet the
requirements for the coconspirator exception and the statements
were held inadmissible. The prosecutor then argued that those
same statements should be admissible as inculpatory penal
interest statements under the new 804(b)(3) exception. Although
the court held that in this case the statements were not admissible, the court outlined its requirements for inculpatory statements in future cases. 40 The Alvarez court test of admissibility
for inculpatory statements was ultimately followed by other cir4
cuit courts and by some state courts.1 1
The Alvarez case itself brought into clear focus the undesirable results of allowing third-person inculpatory statements into
evidence. Gilbert Alvarez was convicted of heroin trafficking
solely on the word of a dead man. At trial, the prosecution's only
witness, Lopez, reported a conversation with the decedent, in
which the decedent had stated that Alvarez was the supplier.
This was all the evidence that the prosecution produced. There
was no corroboration, and Lopez had a strong motivation 14to
implicate Alvarez in order to retain his own probation status.
The Alvarez court held that inculpatory statements were
admissible and "that the admissibility of inculpatory declarations against interest requires corroborating circumstances that
'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' "'143 These
are the exact requirements for exculpatory statements. 44 The
Alvarez court reasoned that if the standard for inculpatory
statements were the same as the standard for exculpatory statements, a unifying principle for all penal interest statements
spiratorRule Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 IND. L.J. 151 (1980) (in-depth
discussion on interplay of these two exceptions).
139. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
140. Id. at 701.
141. See United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984); United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 127-28 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981); United States v. Winley, 638 F.2d 560, 562 (2nd Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959 (1982); State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 150-51, 654 P.2d 77,
82 (1982), At least two courts modified the Alvarez holding. See Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d
421, 428 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982) (must qualify under penal interest
exception and in addition must comply with further confrontation requirements); United
States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
142. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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would be developed.'4

This rationale, however, completely

ignores the divergent constitutional ramifications of exculpatory
and inculpatory statements. Exculpatory statements may be
constitutionally mandated to ensure criminal defendants a fair
trial. 4 6 Inculpatory statements, on the other hand, involve sixth
often
amendment confrontation problems; the Constitution
47
evidence.1
from
excluded
be
they
mandates that
The Alvarez court required clear corroboration for inculpatory statements. 4 8 The court was concerned about the unreliability of inculpatory statements when the declarant was motivated to "curry favor with the authorities. ' '

49

Although the

Alvarez opinion contained numerous warnings about the unreliability and unfairness of receiving inculpatory statements, the
court adopted the view that certain inculpatory statements
could be admissible. 50 Subsequent cases emerged, however, that
modified the court's holding and challenged its reasoning.' 5 '
Alvarez was modified in the Fifth Circuit three years later
in United States v. Sarmiento-Perez.'52 Sarmiento-Perez dealt
with an inculpatory coconspirator statement as part of a written,
custodial confession and developed a heightened test for inculpatory statements in general. 53 Even though the court held that
145. 584 F.2d at 701.
146. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
147. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
148. The Alvarez court cited United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978),
as requiring clear corroboration. In addition, the court set out the following factors for
courts to consider when faced with the reliability problem: any apparent motive to misrepresent the matter, general character of declarant, whether any other person heard the
out-of-court statement, the spontaneity of the statement, the timing of the declaration,
and the relationship between the speaker and the witness. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701-02.
149. The declarant in Alvarez, the prosecutor's principal witness, had pleaded guilty
prior to Alvarez's trial and had received probation. Even though the statements were
made at the scene before custody, the declarant still had substantial motivation to
"curry favor with the authorities." 584 F.2d at 701.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984); Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1009 (1982); United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
819 (1981); United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981).
152. 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981).
153. In Sarmiento-Perez, as in previous cases dealing with inculpatory statements,
the statement was not admissible under the coconspirator exception because it was not
made "in furtherance" of the conspiracy, as required by rule 801. The coconspirator rule
distrusts any statements made after the crime has been committed, at a time when selfpreservation and other motivations may evolve. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 17,
801(d)(2)(E)[01J, at 801-166.
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custodial inculpatory statements are per se inadmissible, the
court discussed the appropriate analysis for all inculpatory
statements. The court stated that Alvarez had not established
maximum limits for confrontation clause requirements, 15 4 and
that more than the threshold of admissibility under Alvarez is
needed. The court recognized that exculpatory and inculpatory
statements demand different constitutional treatment and that
inculpatory statements invoke inherent confrontation clause
problems. These problems, the court stated, require close constitutional examination. 155
A case outside the Fifth Circuit has also questioned the
Alvarez court's ill-founded conclusions. The Seventh Circuit
rejected the premise that rule 804 requirements are enough for
inculpatory penal interest statements.156 Beyond the hearsay
requirements, "it must be clear that the declarant actually made
must be evidence supporting the
the statement" and "there
1 57
statement.
the
truth of
In 1983 the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Layton,1 5 8
refused to rule on whether meeting the Alvarez test automatically satisfied sixth amendment confrontation problems.159 The
court acknowledged that inculpatory statements were new to the
Ninth Circuit, but refused to rule on their admissibility."" The
extrajudicial statement in Layton, however, was admitted
met, and because conbecause all the Alvarez tests had16 been
1
exist.
not
did
problems
frontation
In 1982 the Eighth Circuit held that the Constitution
requires a stronger test than the test proposed in Alvarez. Olson
v. Green 62 paralleled Layton in the heinous nature of the crime.
154. 633 F.2d at 1098-99.
155. Id. at 1099. The "close examination" test is consistent with the advisory note to
FED. R. EvID. 804, which states that rule 804 does not deal with confrontation problems.
Thus, above and beyond any corroboration tests, there must be a separate examination
of confrontation problems.
156. United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1979).
157. Id.
158. 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984).
159. Id. at 561.
160. Id. at 558-59.
161. Id. at 557-58. Layton involved a sensational murder trial. Layton was indicted
on four counts, one for killing Congressman Leo Ryan in Guyana. The first trial resulted
in a hung jury without the admission of inculpatory statements. At the second trial the
prosecutor moved to admit statements of unavailable third persons under the penal
interest exception. They were received, and Layton was convicted. Id.
162. Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982).
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Three persons died in a fire after being bound, gagged, and
doused with gasoline. 163 Although the statement was held to be
harmless error, the court specifically stated that custodial statements implicating a third person do not fall within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception and need independent reliability.'6
The court outlined two separate tests for inculpatory statements: one to ensure qualification under the new hearsay exception, and one for a sufficient degree of reliability for confrontation clause purposes.165 The Eighth Circuit, along with others,
indicated a growing concern for constitutional ramifications
when inculpatory statements are offered in evidence.
Although federal courts have analyzed inculpatory statements in divergent ways, a common thread emerged in the circuits regarding one type of these statements. 6 This trend
excluded all inculpatory statements that were made while the
declarant was in police custody.' 67 This exclusion was supported
by the language in the Advisory Note cautioning against statements made to "curry favor with the authorities."' 6 8 Following
that caution, the Fifth Circuit stated that custodial confessions
are to be viewed with "special suspicion."'6 9
The Eighth Circuit held that the "against criminal interest"
element is not satisfied when a statement is made in police custody because the statement is not really against the penal interest of the declarant. 70 The Second Circuit concluded that state7
ments made in custody must be viewed with strict scrutiny,' '
because they are unreliable and not against the declarant's penal
interest, and that they should be allowed in evidence only in
narrow circumstances.
The Third Circuit also found custodial statements to be
inadmissible. 7 2 The concurring opinion of Judge Adams in
163. Id. at 423.
164. Id. at 427-28.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 427 n.11.
167. United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819
(1981); United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Oliver,
626 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1980).
168. See supra note 83.
169. United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
170. United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383-84 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 742 (1983).
171. United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980).
172. United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
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United States v. Palumbo suggested that noncustodial inculpatory statements should also be intensely scrutinized.17 He
stated that "[t]he naming of another as a compatriot will often
be accompanied by motivations which undermine the trustwor174
thiness of the assertion.'
The federal courts are now requiring a separate constitutional analysis for inculpatory penal interest statements. These
constitutional mandates surfaced in cases subsequent to Alvarez
and solidified the caution in the Advisory Note that the requirements of the rule did not purport to deal with confrontation
problems. The Parriscourt should have heeded these cautions.
The Parris court should have looked, in any event, to other
states' treatment of inculpatory statements. At least seven states
have specifically enacted statutes that exclude all inculpatory
statements against penal interest.'76
VII.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

In Parris,the Washington Supreme Court held that hearsay
statements satisfy the confrontation clause if they fall within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception or if they have a particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness. 176 The court noted that "inculpatory statements are a 'firmly rooted exception' if we add the proviso that they must be accompanied by corroborating circumstances clearly indicating their trustworthiness.' 17 7 At the time
of the decision, however, ER 804 had been codified only
recently, and even if the exception were "firmly rooted," it did
not mention inculpatory statements. The court should have
819 (1981).
173. Id. at. 131.
174. Id. at 132. See also Davenport, The ConfrontationClause and the Co-conspirator Exception in CriminalProsecutions:A FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HAav. L. REV. 1378
(1972). Davenport states:
The invocation of a name may be gratuitous, may be deliberately false in order
to gain advantages for the declarant greater than those that would flow from
naming a real participant or no one at all, may be a cover for concealment
purposes (another kind of "advantage"), or may represent an effort to gain
some personal revenge.
Id. at 1396.
175. Seven states exclude inculpatory statements by statute: ARK. STAT. ANN. §
28.1001, Rule 804(b)(3) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(c) (West 1979); ME. R. EvID.
804(b)(3) (1983); NEv. REV. STAT. § 51.345 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A, Rule 63 (10)
(West 1976); N.D. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) (1983); VT. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) (1983).
176. 98 Wash. 2d at 148, 654 P.2d at 81.
177. Id.
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looked more rigorously at the constitutional principles and policies that surround the confrontation clause of the United States
Constitution and the similar clause in the Washington State
Constitution.1 7
A.

Constitution of the United States

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
. . to be confronted with the witness against him ....,,179
The right to confrontation protects the reliability and trustworthiness of evidence introduced against a criminal defendant by
requiring that a witness testify under oath,"'0 by placing the
declarant before the trier of fact to observe the declarant's
demeanor,18 ' and by subjecting the declarant to cross-examination.182 Cross-examination has been called "a major reason
underlying the confrontation rule"' 8 3 and the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. "8 The United

right.

178. The court of appeals did attempt to squeeze in some legislative history within
footnotes in its opinion. For example, footnote six states:
There can be no real dispute that the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is a "firmly rooted" exception. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
ER 804(b)(3) was adopted verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Comment to
ER 804. As noted by Judge Weinstein, the Federal Rules of Evidence are 'a
firmly rooted' set of hearsay exceptions. 4 Weinstein & M. Berger, at 6. Thus,
while the case law in Washington prior to adoption in 1979 of the Rules of
Evidence is unclear as to the extent to which statements against penal interests were admissible, see State v. Russell, 27 Wash. App. 309, 314 n.1, 617 P.2d
467 (1980), we believe the adoption verbatim of the federal rule satisfies the
"firmly rooted" requirements of Roberts.
Parris,30 Wash. App. at 275 n.6, 633 P.2d at 919 n.6.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment was included in the first ten
amendments proposed by the First Congress on Sept. 25, 1789. These amendments were
ratified on December 15, 1791.
180. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 n.6 (1980) (giving a statement under oath
increases its reliability because it impresses upon the declarant the seriousness of the
matter, and guards against the possibility of perjury); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
158-59 (1970).
181. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (the heart of this
constitutional guarantee is the accused's right to compel the witness "to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See also 4 J. WEINSTmIN, supra note
17, 8001011, at 800-10 (the requirement of personal presence in front of the jury makes
it more difficult to falsely accuse a person, particularly if that person is an accused and is
present at trial).
182. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
183. Id. at 406-07.
184. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1367, at 32, cited in California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970).
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States Supreme Court has stated: "[W]e have expressly declared
that to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law."'185
When the penal interest hearsay exception has been
involved, however, the Supreme Court has not permitted any
significant erosion of the defendant's right to confrontation. 18
In Douglas v. Alabama,8 7 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for murder, excluding the inculpatory statement because
the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and because the confession was a "crucial link" in the government's case. 18s
In 1968 the Supreme Court again excluded an incriminating
statement in Bruton v. United States. 89 The Supreme Court
reversed Bruton's conviction and held that limiting instructions
were inadequate protection in light of the defendant's right to
confront the witness.19 0 Moreover, when the introduction of a
confession adds substantial or critical weight to the government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, the
defendant has been denied the sixth amendment confrontation
right.1 9 1
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant
but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized
when accomplices do take the stand and the jury is instructed
to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift blame onto others .... It was against such threats
to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed.' 92
185. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308 (1974) (right of cross-examination is the ultimate interest of confrontation).
186. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1965). More recently the Court has stated that the diminution of the right to confrontation calls into questiofi the "integrity of the fact-finding process." Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965)).
187. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
188. Id. at 419.
189. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
190. Id. at 126. The trial judge cautioned the jury that the admission "if used, can
only be used against the defendant Evans. It is hearsay insofar as the defendant ...
Bruton is concerned, and you are not to consider it in any respect to the defendant
Bruton, because insofar as he is concerned, it is hearsay." Id. at 125 n.2.
191. Id. at 128.
192. Id. at 136. Justice Stewart, concurring, wrote:
I think it clear that the underlying rationale of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause precludes reliance upon cautionary instructions when the
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The Bruton principle does not allow inculpatory statements into
evidence if they add substantial weight to the case and there is
no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 9 s
In 1970 the Supreme Court, in California v. Green,194 reaffirmed the rule that some type of cross-examination is necessary
to meet confrontation requirements. The Court held that the
exercise of extensive cross-examination at a preliminary hearing
by the same attorney representing the defendant at trial was
sufficient to meet confrontation clause requirements when those
preliminary statements were later admitted at trial. The Court
recognized that more than once it had "found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements. . . were admitted
under an arguably recognized hearsay exception.""' The Green
Court recognized as the core value of the confrontation clause
the ability to "confront" the witness at trial. 96
Again in 1970 the Supreme Court, in Dutton v. Evans, held
that a hearsay statement may be admissible when it is in no
sense crucial or devastating to the case.' 7 The Court stressed
highly damaging out-of-court statement of a codefendant, who is not subject to
cross-examination, is deliberately placed before the jury at a joint trial. A basic
premise of the Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is that certain kinds of
hearsay . . .are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight
it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give. . . It is
for this very reason that an out-of-court accusation is universally conceded to
be constitutionally inadmissible against the accused, rather than admissible for
the little it may be worth.
Id. at 137-38.
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, argued:
As to the defendant, the confession of the codefendant is wholly inadmissible.
It is hearsay, subject to all the dangers of inaccuracy which characterize hearsay generally. . . .More than this, however, the statements of a codefendant
have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion. . . . Due to his strong
motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than
ordinary hearsay evidence. . . .[T]he codefendant's confession implicating the
defendant is intrinsically much less reliable.
Id. at 141-42.
193. Id. at 137.
194. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
195. Id. at 155-56.
196. Id. at 157. The Green Court specifically stated that it did not choose to map
out a theory of the confrontation clause that could be used for all hearsay exceptions.
The Court reasoned that when the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and
to submit to cross-examination, the cases support the conclusion that the admission of
his out-of-court statements does not create a confrontation problem. Id. at 158.
197. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Dutton involved the murder of three police officers. One of
the witnesses against Evans was a prison mate. He testified that a coconspirator of Evans
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that this was, in a sense, a harmless error case because twenty
witnesses were called for the prosecution. Under Georgia law the
statement was received in evidence under its traditional coconspirator exception."' 8
In 1980, in Ohio v. Roberts,199 the Court addressed the confrontation clause and its interplay with the hearsay rule following the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 804. The Court
held that testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible
in a subsequent trial. The Court explained that when prior testimony is given under oath and with cross-examination, confrontation requirements are satisfied.2 0 0 The Court held further that
confrontation clause problems may not arise when the statement
falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. 0 1 The Court
warned that absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness, such evidence must be excluded. 2
The Roberts Court stressed reliability and actual "physical"
confrontation as the guiding principle behind the confrontation
clause.20 3 The Court held that when there is a "meaningful"
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at a prior time, the
confrontation clause is not violated if all other evidentiary criteria are met.
The Supreme Court consistently has demanded some form
of confrontation under oath in order to satisfy the sixth amendment. To pass muster, a statement that is an exception to the
hearsay rule must meet strict evidentiary requirements, including the requirement that some "cross-examination" must have
told him, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in
this now." Id. at 77. See also Note, supra note 111; Note, Inculpatory Declarations
Against Interest and the Confrontation Clause: A Wider Spectrum of Admissible Evidence Against Co-Conspirators,48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 943 (1982) (concluding that inculpatory statements by coconspirators should be admitted under rule 801(d)(2)(e) to the
extent that they are in fact against the declarant's interest, and alternatively, that the
stringent requirements of the rule should be met before an inculpatory coconspirator's
statement is received).
198. Contrary to the majority rule that the coconspirator exception is limited to
statements made "during the furtherance of the conspiracy," Georgia admitted statements of coconspirators that were made during the concealment of a criminal enterprise.
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1981). See Chatterton v. State, 221 Ga. 424, 144 S.E.2d 726,
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015 (1965).

199. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
200. Id. at 70.
201. Id. at 66.
202. Id. See also Read, The New Confrontation-HearsayDilemma, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 48 (1972).
203. 448 U.S. at 66.

19841

Inculpatory Statements Go Too Far

been possible in the past, or at least that the statement must not
be "crucial" or "devastating" to the case. Only when these tests
are met can a court be satisfied that the barrier of the sixth
amendment has been overcome.
B.

Washington State's Treatment of the Right of
Confrontation

Under article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, the accused is given the right "to meet the witnesses
against him face to face."20 4 This "face-to-face" requirement is
not found in the United States Constitution and, therefore, suggests a greater protection for a Washington criminal defendant's
right to confrontation. Justice Williams has observed that "the
face-to-face language of Const. art. 1, § 22 seems to require
actual physical confrontation between the accused and any
adverse witnesses . . . . [I]t also cannot be disputed that this
language at least provides greater protection than is afforded
20
under both hearsay rules and the Sixth Amendment. 5
Washington courts have adamantly defended this right. The
supreme court has consistently affirmed that the right to crossexamine is basic in a criminal case and should be "zealously
guarded" by courts.2 0 6 Washington courts have also held that the
ability of the jury to assess the credibility of the declarant at
trial is a basic purpose of the confrontation clause.2 07 The right
to confront a witness is not absolute,2 0 8 but may in an appropriate case bow to other legitimate interests, such as the need to
204. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 provides:
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in
his own behalf, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is
charged to have been committed and the right to appeal in all cases ....
In
no instance shall any accused person before final judgment be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
205. State v. Valladares, 99 Wash. 2d 663, 674, 664 P.2d 508, 514 (1983) (Williams,
C.J., concurring).
206. State v. Swenson, 62 Wash. 2d 259, 278, 382 P.2d 614, 625-26 (1963). See also
State v. York, 28 Wash. App. 33, 621 P.2d 784 (1980) (fundamental constitutional right
to cross-examine the witness).
207. State v. Fullen, 7 Wash. App. 369, 380, 499 P.2d 893, 900 (1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 985 (1973).
208. State v. Dault, 25 Wash. App. 568, 570, 608 P.2d 270, 272 (1980).
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discover the truth when hearsay evidence is very reliable. When
this happens, however, Washington courts have cautioned that
"denial or diminution calls into question the integrity of the
fact-finding process and requires the competing interest to be
closely examined." 2 0 9 In addition, as Justice Williams has stated,

this close examination must include a careful balancing of the
competing interests of the state and of the accused, with added
weight being placed on the accused's side of the scale.210
Very few situations have survived Washington's close scrutiny of competing interests and the confrontation clause. Among
the few exceptions are testimony at a previous trial21 ' and prior

testimony at some type of preliminary hearing. 212 In both of
these instances, the defendant's confrontation right was thoroughly satisfied at some point during the case.
Washington courts continue to stress that the defendant's
right to an actual physical confrontation of an adverse witness is
paramount. In In re Pettit v. Rhay,215 the supreme court
demanded a "meaningful" and "real" opportunity to crossexamine the adverse witness.21" The court held that because
cross-examination is essential to the purpose of confrontation, it
must not be a mere matter of form.2 15 Because Pettit was not
represented by counsel at a preliminary hearing, he was unable
to "effectively" cross-examine the witness." '
The courts have extended the effective cross-examination
rationale by holding that even at trial, when extensive crossexamination for credibility was not allowed, fundamental fair209. State v. York, 28 Wash. App. 33, 37, 621 P.2d 784, 786 (1980) (citing Berger v.
California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)).
210. Parris,98 Wash. 2d at 170-71, 654 P.2d at 92-93.
211. State v. Dault, 25 Wash. App. 568, 608 P.2d 270 (1980) (at retrial declarant
claimed loss of memory and thus was unavailable; prosecutor brought in the testimony
from the first trial); State v. Ortego, 22 Wash. 2d 552, 157 P.2d 320 (1945). In Ortego, the
court established four stringent requirements that must be met for the admissibility of
previous testimony: (1) the witness is unavailable; (2) the witness was sworn and testified
at the previous trial; (3) the accused was present and given an opportunity to crossexamine; and (4) the person who relates the prior testimony was present, heard the testimony, and can state the substance and nature of the subject matter sought to be established. Id. at 563-64, 157 P.2d at 326.
212. State v. Roebuck, 75 Wash. 2d 67, 448 P.2d 934 (1968) (testimony at preliminary hearing admitted when defense counsel had opportunity to cross-examine at that
preliminary hearing).
213. 62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963).
214. Id. at 521, 383 P.2d at 894.
215. Id. at 521, 383 P.2d at 893.
216. Id. at 521, 383 P.2d at 893-94.
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ness demanded confrontation of such testimony.2 17 They have
also stated that "[i]t is fundamental that a defendant charged
with commission of a crime should be given great latitude in the
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses to show motive or
credibility."" 8
Washington's constitution and previous case law support
the right of a criminal defendant to confront an opposing witness face-to-face. The Parris majority completely ignored these
words in the state constitution and failed to balance the interests involved when inculpatory penal interest statements are in
issue. Had the court done so, the defendant's right to confrontation and a fair trial would have outweighed the inherently unreliable inculpatory statements against penal interest.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

A crucial case is now pending before Division II of the
Washington Court of Appeals.2 19 State v. Edmondson involves a
conviction for aggravated murder based almost exclusively on
inculpatory statements against penal interest. The court should
take this opportunity to reconsider the Parris case and to
realign itself with the historical and continuing view that statements by a witness inculpating the defendant are inherently
unreliable if they are merely against the penal interest of the
witness. The federal courts should follow suit.
Throughout the history of United States jurisprudence until
1975, with exceptions in only a few jurisdictions, declarations
against penal interest were excluded even when offered to exculpate the criminal defendant. The statement against the penal
interest of a witness could not be received against the defendant
because it inculpated the defendant as well. The extensive legislative history surrounding Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)
clearly evidences opposition to the admissibility of inculpatory
third-person penal interest statements. The text of rule
804(b)(3) expressly mentions exculpatory penal interest statements. The rule of construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, "expression of one thing is the exclusion of another,"
217. State v. York, 28 Wash. App. 33, 621 P.2d 784 (1980); State v. Roberts, 25
Wash. App. 830, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980).
218. State v. Peterson, 2 Wash. App. 464, 466-67, 469 P.2d 980, 981 (1970).
219. State v. Edmondson, appeal docketed, No. 6942-3-II (Wash. Ct. App. Div. II
Jan. 31, 1984).
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requires that inculpatory third-person penal interest statements
be excluded. In any event, the context of virtually all such statements-the desire to displace or share guilt, or the desire to
secure prosecutorial favor-proclaims their unreliability.
Admission of exculpatory declarations against penal interest
may be constitutionally required. The authors believe that
exclusion of inculpatory declarations against penal interest is
constitutionally required by the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and even more clearly by article I,
section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Washington.
The State of Washington does have, and should have, a
strong policy to convict criminals. An equally strong policy, however, is to ensure a fair trial to persons charged with a crime.
The rule of the Parriscase effectively abrogates the hearsay rule
and often will result in unfair trials. The rule should be
discarded.

